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ORAL TESTIMONY
Mr. Chairman, Senators, Commissioner Gibbs, members of the press and
guests:
I am Professor James W. Childs of The University of Akron School of
Law and Director of The Center for Taxation Studies, Tax Clinic Program.,
Our Clinic represents low-income taxpayers in audits, collection proceedings,
and litigation before The United States Tax Court. It is composed of 19 law
students and graduate business students, 15 of whom are with me today, and
two of whom will present the testimony. In addition, the Tax Clinic prepares
between 200 and 400 low-income taxpayer's tax returns annually. The Tax Clinic
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assists in the training of 100 retired tax return preparer volunteers, and pro-
vides computer support for over 30 low income tax preparation sites. I wish
to now yield to Cynthia Davis.
There are over 150 different penalties in the Internal Revenue Code (supra.,
pp. 1-12). These penalties can range from fines to imprisonment, or both. These
penalties are assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as are tax defi-
ciencies and interest. Interest begins running from the date of demand until
the tax, accrued interest, and penalties are fully paid.
Interest is not viewed as a penalty, but as compensation for the govern-
ment's being deprived of the use of the money. Some penalties are interest sen-
sitive, and the daily accrual of interest on these penalties indicates a revenue
yield policy. See pages 14 and 15 for examples of how this combination of in-
terest and penalties can drastically increase the amount owed by the taxpayer,
even multiplying the amount of the deficiency by as much as 530% over a ten
year period.
Penalties on top of penalties indicate a revenue yield policy. These penalties
are supposedly assessed to reimburse the government for the expense of in-
vestigation and litigation. A lack of Congressional guidance tends to result in
IRS agents applying all penalties to taxpayers without qualified representation.
The average low-income taxpayer does not have the necessary funds to acquire
this service (see pages 15-17).
A major problem is that a lack of reading skills prevents many taxpayers
from complying with the tax laws. The reading level of most IRS publications
is extremely high in relation to most of the written material that low-income
taxpayers would normally come into contact with. As measured by the Fry
Readability Formula, a Form 1040EZ instruction booklet requires an 8.45 grade
reading level. The reading level required for a Statutory Notice of Deficiency
is 8.7. It should be noted that the March 3, 1988 Wall Street Journal required
only a 7.1 grade reading level (see pages 19-21).
The Internal Revenue Service should write instructions for forms 1040,
1040A, and 1040EZ at between the second and fourth grade level. The Univer-
sity of Akron Center for Taxation Studies would be pleased to offer to provide
technically correct instructions for such forms, written at a reading and
understanding level of grades two through four within a time frame established
by the Internal Revenue Service, and we could do so even if you were to pass
legislation in November, which is unlikely this year.
According to the U.S. Department of Education, the following percent of
the population possesses a 8.45 grade reading level: Blacks, 19.8 %; Hispanics
37%; persons with less than a high school education, 11%; and high school
graduates, 50.2%. This study indicates that the majority of low-income tax-
payers will find it difficult, if not impossible, to comprehend and, thus, to comply
[Vol. 5
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with the federal income tax laws (see pages 19-21).
Mr. Chairman, I now yield to E. Earle Burke.
We suggest two alternatives to help remedy these problems. At a minimum,
representation should be provided to the taxpayer before penalties or interest
are assessed. One possibility is to adopt the ombudsman concept. Another is
the to establish Tax Clinics, like ours, nationwide. These clinics would be li-
censed and supervised by the Director of Practice of the IRS to assist taxpayers.
A third is to use retired professionals in a senior citizen's clinic structure, also
licensed by the Director of Practice. A fourth possibility is a combination of
all three. If the taxpayer cannot afford representation, and pro bono represen-
tation is not available, then the penalty system should be altered with respect
to low-income taxpayers. This could apply to taxpayers with a gross income
of $25,000 or less per year, before FICA taxes (see pages 22-26).
We have encountered several cases in which taxpayers have missed the 90
day period to protest the assessment, and since they could not afford to pay
the tax, they could not litigate the matter in court. Without litigation to obtain
abatement, interest and penalties continue to accrue, sometimes to levels far
beyond what the low-income taxpayer will ever be able to pay (see pages 18-19).
If the taxpayer can demonstrate the inability to pay the penalties and in-
terest, the penalties and interest should be automatically abated at the audit
level. Part of the justification for this proposal is the fact that a substantial number
of these low-income taxpayers cannot at this time, and probably never will,
be able to pay. Therefore, these amounts being carried on the books of the govern-
ment are illusory (see pages 25-26).
We contend that in order to assess penalties and interest, the IRS should
be required to notify every taxpayer who can be held responsible for the tax
and the deficiency. This could be accomplished by sending all notices by cer-
tified mail (see page 26).
The low personal exemptions in the Code enable the IRS to impose levies
on a substantial portion of the taxpayer's weekly wages. This IRS policy precludes
collection and increases federal social service expenditures. Since the IRS will
not levy against unemployment compensation or welfare benefits, this provides
an economic incentive for low-income taxpayers to opt out of the job market
and onto the public dole. The current exemption amounts bear no relationship
to what the taxpayer needs for basic necessities. By increasing the exemption
amount, the government will not only encourage a return to employment, but
will also make at least a portion of the deficiency collectible, generating future
tax revenue (see pages 26-28).
Unrepresented low-income taxpayers often do not fully understand their
rights under the existing statutory notice of deficiency. In the case of a divorce,
for example, the IRS might send the notice to the taxpayer's spouse. When a
19881
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joint tax return is involved, the IRS is permitted to send a single joint notice
of deficiency to the last known address. This is true unless either spouse has
notified the District Director that separate residences have been established.
Even then, the IRS may still send a single joint notice, and one of the taxpayers
will not be notified. Thus, after 90 days, the taxpayer loses the right to litigate
in court, unless full payment has been made beforehand. This can be construed
as denial of due process of law, which guarantees the right of access to the
courts, regardless of economic status. Often, even the $60.00 filing fee intimidates
the low income taxpayer, who considers it equivalent to a small fortune (see
pages 26-33).
Certain assessments may be made without the taxpayer receiving any notice
of deficiency. Thus, no assessment made under these circumstances may be
litigated in Tax Court, since a notice of deficiency is a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite. Interestingly, the Code specifically states that the notice of assessment
in these situations is not a notice of deficiency (see pages 34).
The revenue yield from penalties results in a regressive economic impact
on the low-income taxpayer. Often, just to pay the tax, installment payments
must be arranged. However, without qualified representation, the low-income
taxpayer may not even be aware of this option (see pages 35-36).
When the penalty system was originally enacted, it was created to enforce
the collection of taxes. However, since 1981, legislative history indicates a trend
toward using penalties as a revenue raiser. Abuses by high-income; taxpayers
have brought about a number of new penalties. Unfortunately, the low-income
taxpayer has been caught in this net. Stacking of penalties generally works as
a deterrent to abuses by high-income taxpayers, but since the low-income tax-
payer usually lacks the necessary skills to understand the tax system, he is often
penalized merely for failure to comprehend (see pages 37-38).
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Interest sensitive penalties should have a floor placed beneath them. In
that way, the low-income taxpayer with a minimal standard of living would be
exempt. This would reduce the administration cost of collection and minimize
regressiveness. At the same time as raising revenue, they would deter flagrant
abuse of the tax laws by high-income taxpayers, as well as introducing some
progressivity into the system (see pages 38-39).
Abatement of the second or higher non-interest penalties should be an audit
level function in the case of the low-income taxpayer. These floor levels should
be set by Congress and indexed. Stacked penalties should be automatically abated
if, after the levy, the taxpayer does not have sufficient income to pay the primary
deficiency (see page 39).
The mandatory services of a qualified representative should be provided
[Vol. 5
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at the time of audit or at the very least before wage levies are imposed. Higher
amounts of the taxpayer's income should be exempt from the wage levy, as well
as being indexed for inflation. The option of obtaining bankruptcy relief for
all taxes, interest, and penalties should be available to the low-income taxpayer
(see pages 39-41).
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UNITED STATES SENATE
FINANCE COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PENALTIES
TESTIMONY
by
UNIVERSITY OF AKRON
CENTER FOR TAXATION STUDIES
STUDENT TAX CLINIC
I. PENALTIES AS REVENUE, Low-INcOME TAXPAYER IMPACT.
A. Current tax policy is not clearly set forth.
There are over 150 different penalties presently in the Internal Revenue
Code.
1. GENERAL PENALTIES
1. Sec. 6651(a)(1) Failure to file a return: 5% per month up to 25% of tax
due.
2. Sec. 6651(a)(2) Failure to pay tax due on return in Sec. 6651(a): 0.5%
per month up to 25 % of the tax due.
3. Sec. 6651(a)(3) Failure to pay amount in Sec. 6651(a)(2) within 10 days
of notice of deficiency: 0.5% per month up to 25% of the tax due.
4. Sec. 6651(a) Also states that failure to pay amount in Sec. 6651(a)(2)
within 60 days of the notice of deficiency is at least the lesser of $100 or 100 %
of the tax due.
5. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(A)(i) Failure to file a statement regarding amount of
payment required by Sec. 6041: $50.
6. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(A)(ii) Failure to file statement relating to fishing boat
operators: $50.
7. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(A)(iii) Failure to file a statement relating to income tax
withheld: $50.
8. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(B)(i) Failure to make a return required of direct sellers:
$50.
9. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(B)(ii) Failure to make return required of brokers: $50.
10. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(B)(iii) Failure to make a return relating to reporting
payment of wages in the form of group life insurance: $50.
11. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(B)(iv) Failure to make a return relating to reporting
of tips: $50.
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12. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(B((v) Failure to make a return relating to mortgage in-
terest received: $50.
13. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(B)(vi) Failure to make return relating to cash received:
$50.
14. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(B)(vii) Failure to make a return relating to abandon-
ment of security: $50.
15. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(B)(viii) Failure to make a return relating to exchanges
of partnership interests: $50.
16. Sec. 6652(a)(1)(B)(ix) Failure to make a return relating to donated pro-
perty: $50.
17. Sec. 6652(a)(2)(A)(i) Failure to file statement related to payment of
dividends: $50.
18. Sec. 6652(a)(2)(A)(ii) Failure to file statement relating to payment of
patronage dividends: $50.
19. Sec. 6652(a)(2)(A)(iii) Failure to file statement relating to payment of
interest: $50.
20. through 34. Sec. 6652(a)(3)(A) Separate penalty of 10%, $100, or 5 %
of gross proceeds for intentional disregard of filing requirements relating to
5 through 19.
35. Sec. 6652(b)(1) Failure to file statement relating to payment of dividends
aggregating less than $10: $1.
36. Sec. 6652(b)(2) Failure to file statement relating to payment of patronage
dividends aggregating less than $10: $1.
37. Sec. 6652(c) Failure to report tips: 50% of Sec. 3101 tax.
38. Sec. 6652(d)(1) Failure to file return by exempt organization: $10 per day.
39. Sec. 6652(d)(2) Failure of manager of exempt organization to file return:
$10 per day.
40. Sec. 6652(d)(3) Failure to meet requirements with respect to public
inspection of exempt organization's annual return: $10 per day.
41. Sec. 6652(e)(1) Failure to register pension plan: $1 per participant per
day.
42. Sec. 6652(e)(2) Failure to file change of status by pension plan: $1
per day.
43. Sec. 6652(f) Failure to file information required in regard to deferred
compensation: $25 per day.
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44. Sec. 6652(g)(1)(A) Failure to file return required by Sec. 6039C: $25
per day.
45. Sec. 6652(g)(1)(B) Failure to furnish statement required by Sec.
6039C(b)(3): $25.
46. Sec. 6652(h) Failure to provide required information in connection
with deductible employee contributions: $25 per day.
47. Sec. 6652(i) Failure to give notice to recipients of certain pensions: $10.
48. Sec. 66520) Failure to give written explanation to recipients of cer-
tain qualified rollover distributions: $10.
49. Sec. 6653(a)(1)(A) For negligence add 5 % of underpayment.
50. Sec. 6653(a)(1)(B) and 50% of interest under Sec. 6601.
51. Sec. 6653(b)(1)(A) For fraud add 75% of underpayment.
52. Sec. 6653(b)(1)(B) and 50% of interest under Sec. 6601.
53. Sec. 6653(e) Failure to pay stamp tax: 50% of total underpayment.
54. Sec. 6654 Failure to pay estimated income tax: Sec. 6621 rate X under-
payment X period of underpayment.
55. Sec. 6655 Failure of corporation to pay estimated income tax: same
as Sec. 6654.
56. Sec. 6656(a) Underpayment of deposit of tax: 5 % of underpayment.
57. Sec. 6656(b) Overstatement of claim of deposit of tax: 25 % of claim.
58. Sec. 6657 Bad check: 1% of face value unless under $500, then lesser
of $5 or amount of check.
59. Sec. 6659(a)(1) Overstatement of valuation by an individual: see Sec.
6659(b).
60. Sec. 6659(a)(2) Overstatement of valuation by a closely held or per-
sonal service corporation: see Sec. 6659(b).
61. Sec. 6659(f) Overstatement of value of charitable deduction: 30%.
62. Sec. 6660(a) Understatement of valuation for Estate/Gift Tax purposes:
see Sec. 6660(b).
63. Sec. 6661(a) Substantial understatement of income tax liability: 10%
of underpayment.
2. SUBCHAPTER B: ASSESSABLE PENALTIES
64. Sec. 6672(a) Failure to collect tax: 100% of tax.
[Vol. 5AKRON TAX JOURNAL
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65. Sec. 6672(a) Failure to truthfully account for tax: 100% of tax.
66. Sec. 6672(a) Failure to pay over tax: 100% of tax.
67. Sec. 6672(a) Attempt to evade or defeat tax: 100% of tax.
68. Sec. 6673 Bringing suit in Tax Court to delay assessment of tax: up
to $5000.
69. Sec. 6673 Frivolous or groundless suit in Tax Court: up to $5000.
70. Sec. 6674 Failure to furnish statement to an employee: $50.
71. Sec. 6674 Fraudulent statement to an employee: $500.
72. Sec. 6675 Excessive claims with respect to certain fuels: greater of
twice the excessive amount, or $10.
73. Sec. 6676(a)(1) Failure to put TIN on return: $5.
74. Sec. 6676(a)(2) Failure to furnish TIN to another person: $50.
75. Sec. 6676(a)(3) Failure to provide another person's TIN in a statement
regarding such person: $50.
76. Sec. 6676(b)(1) Failure to provide the TIN of a payee of interest or
dividends: $50.
77. Sec. 6676(b)(1) Including incorrect TIN of a payee of interest or
dividends: $50.
78. Sec. 6676(c)(1) Failure to provide TIN to another person in regard to
Sec. 215: $50.
79. Sec. 6676(c)(2) Failure to provide another person's TIN on return in
regard to Sec. 215: $50.
80. Sec. 6677(a) Failure to file information with respect to a foreign trust:
5% of amount transferred to trust.
81. Sec. 6678(a)(1) Failure to furnish statement under Sec. 6041: $50.
82. Sec. 6678(a)(1) Failure to furnish statement regarding remuneration
for services: $50.
83. Sec. 6678(a)(1) Failure to furnish statement regarding direct sales: $50.
84. Sec. 6678(a)(1) Failure to furnish statement regarding payment of
dividends: $50.
85. Sec. 6678(a)(1) Failure to provide statement regarding payment of
patronage dividends: $50.
86. Sec. 6678(a)(1) Failure to provide statement regarding brokers: $50.
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87. Sec. 6678(a)(1) Failure to provide statement regarding payment of in-
terest:- $50.
88. Sec. 6678(a)(1) Failure to provide statement regarding payment of wages
in the form of group life insurance: $50.
89. Sec. 6678(a)(2) Failure to provide statement regarding corporations:
$50.
90. Sec. 6678(a)(3)(A) Failure to file a statement regarding windfall prof-
its tax: $50.
91. Sec. 6678(a)(3)(B) Failure to file a statement regarding fishing boat
operators: $50.
92. Sec. 6678(a)(3)(C) Failure to file a statement regarding crude oil: $50.
93. Sec. 6678(a)(3)(D) Failure to file a statement regarding income tax
withheld: $50.
94. Sec. 6678(a)(3)(E) Failure to file a statement regarding employee's tips:
$50.
95. Sec. 6678(b) Failure to file interest or dividend statement: $50.
96. Sec. 6678(c) Failure to notify partnership of exchange of partnership
interest: $50.
97. Sec. 6679(a) Failure to file return with respect to foreign corporation:
$1000.
98. Sec. 6679(a) Failure to file return with respect to foreign partnership:
$1000.
99. Sec. 6682(a)(1) Furnishing false withholding information: $500.
100. Sec. 6684(a)(1) Becoming liable for Chapter 42 tax relating to a private
foundation due to failure to act: a penalty equal to 100% of the tax.
101. Sec. 6685 Failure to comply with Sec. 7207 regarding private foun-
dation's annual return: $1000.
102. Sec. 6686 Failure to file a return by a DISC or FSC: $100.
103. Sec. 6686 Failure to supply information by* a DISC or FSC: $100.
104. Sec. 6687(a) Failure to supply place of residence regarding self-
employment taxes: $5.
105. Sec. 6688 Failure to provide information in regard to Sec. 7654: $100.
106. Sec. 6689(a) Failure to file notice of redetermination of foreign tax:
5% per month up to 25 %.
107. Sec. 6690 Fraudulent statement to plan participant: $50.
10
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108. Sec. 6690 Failure to provide statement to plan participant: $50.
109. Sec. 6693 Failure to provide report on IRA: $50.
110. Sec. 6693 Failure to provide report on annuity: $50.
111. Sec. 6694(a) Negligent understatement of taxpayer liability by tax return
preparer (TRP): $100.
112. Sec. 6694(b) Willful understatement of taxpayer liability by TRP: $500.
113. Sec. 6695(a) Failure to provide copy of return to taxpayer by TRP: $25.
114. Sec. 6695(b)(1) Failure to inform taxpayer of Sec. 274 requirements
by TRP: $25.
115. Sec. 6695(b)(2) Failure of TRP to sign return: $25.
116. Sec. 6695(c) Failure of TRP to provide TIN: $25.
117. Sec. 6695(d) Failure to retain copy of return by TRP: $50.
118. Sec. 6695(e) Failure to file correct information return: $100.
119. Sec. 6695(f) Negotiation of refund check by TRP: $500.
120. Sec. 6697 Liability for tax of qualified investment entities: Penalty
equals 100% of tax.
121. Sec. 6698(a)(1) Failure to file partnership return: $50 per month per
partner.
122. Sec. 6698(a)(2) Failure to file a partnership return showing informa-
tion required by Sec. 6031: $50 per month per partner.
123. Sec. 6698A Failure to provide information regarding carryover basis
property: $100.
124. Sec. 6698A(b) Failure to provide information regarding carryover basis
property to beneficiary: $50.
125. Sec. 6699(a)(1) Failure to satisfy requirements of Sec. 409 regarding
qualfied investments: Amount equal to failure.
126. Sec. 6699(a)(2) Failure to make contribution under Sec. 48(n): Amount
equal to failure.
127. Sec. 6699(a)(3) Failure to satisfy any requirement of Sec. 409 regard-
ing credit claimed under Sec. 44D: Amount equal to failure.
128. Sec. 6699(a)(4) Failure to make any contribution under Sec. 44G(c)
(1)(B): Amount equal to failure.
129. Sec. 6700(a)(1)(A)(i) Organizing a partnership which promotes an
abusive tax shelter: $1000 or 20% of the gross income derived.
11
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130. Sec. 6700(a)(1)(A)(ii) Organizing any investment plan to promote an
abusive tax shelter: $1000 or 20%.
131. Sec. 6700(a)(1)(A)(iii) Organizing any other plan or arrangement to
promote an abusive tax shelter: $1000 or 20%.
132. Sec. 6700(a)(1)(B) Participating in the sale of any interest in a plan
referred to in Sec. 6700(a)(1)(A): $1000 or 20%.
133. through 136. If in Sec. 6700(a) there is a gross overstatement as to
any matter, the penalty is $1000 or 20% of the gross income derived.
137. Sec. 6701(a) Aiding and'abetting understatement of tax liability: $1000.
138. Sec. 6701(a) Aiding and abetting understatement of tax liability by
a corporation: $10,000.
139. Sec. 6702(a)(1)(A) Filing a return with insufficient information due
to a frivolous position: $500.
140. Sec. 6702(a)(1)(B) Filing an incorrect return due to a frivolous posi-
tion: $500.
141. Sec. 6702(a)(1)(A) Filing a return with insufficient information to delay
tax: $500.
142. Sec. 6702(a)(1)(B) Filing an incorrect return to delay tax: $500.
143. Sec. 6704(a) Failure to keep records required under Sec. 6047(e): $50.
144. Sec. 6705 Failure of broker to provide notice to payors: $500.
145. Sec. 6706(a) Failure to show information required on debt instrument:
$50.
146. Sec. 6706(b) Failure to furnish information required under Sec.
1275(c)(2): 11% of aggregate price of such issue.
147. Sec. 6707(a)(1)(A) Failure to register tax shelter: $500.
148. Sec. 6707(a)(1)(B) Registering false information in regard to a tax
shelter: $500.
149. Sec. 6707(b)(1) Failure to furnish identification of tax shelter: $50.
150. Sec. 6707(b)(2) Failure to include identification number of tax shelter
on return: $50.
151. Sec. 6708 Failure to maintain list of investors in potentially abusive
tax shelters: $50.
152. Sec. 6708[9](a) Material misstatement about mortgage certificate due
to negligence: $1000.
153. Sec. 6708[9](b) If #152 is due to fraud: $10,000.
12
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154. Sec. 6708[9](c) Failure to file report regarding mortgage credit cer-
tificate: $200.
3. SUBCHAPTER A - CRIMES
There are 20 code sections (7201 through 7241) which cover criminal
penalties, including fines and prison sentences.
4. SUBCHAPTER B - OTHER OFFENSES
There are nine code sections (7261 through 7275) which cover other
penalties. These penalties are usually fines.
Some penalties are interest-sensitive.
Section 6651 failure to file, or Section 6651(a)(2) failure to pay tax, Sec-
tion 6653(a) negligence penalty and Section 6653(b) for fraud are assessed,
collected and paid as if they were a part of the tax or deficiency. If it is not
paid in full within ten days of notice and demand from the district director,
interest is charged upon the unpaid amount at an annual rate as prescribed under
Internal Revenue Code Section 6651, from the date of notice and demand until
the amount is paid.
According to Rev. Proc. 63-5 (1963-1 C.B.) "... deficiency or (485) will
not stop the running of interest, whenever an offer of payment is made prior
to the determination, the examining officer will inform the taxpayer that it is
preferable to make payment when the amount of deficiency or additional tax
is determined."
According to House of Representatives; Rept. 100-391; 100th Congress;
1st Session; H.R. 3545 "Interest on the negligence and fraud penalties generally
begins on the date these penalties are assessed...."
One can infer that interest-sensitive penalties indicate a Congressional
policy of revenue yield from penalties.
"Interest payments are viewed not as a penalty but simply as compensa-
tion for the United States having been deprived of the funds in question for
the period until they are actually paid to the IRS and available as general
revenue." United States v. Augspurger, 508 F. Supp. 327 (1981).
Daily accrual of interest on tax deficiencies and penalties, including
interest-sensitive penalties, further indicate a policy of revenue yield from
penalties.
Example 1. If a taxpayer owing $500.00 was penalized under code section
6651 for failure to pay, he would owe penalties of 25 % under section 6651(a)(1),
25 % under section 6651(a)(2), 25 % under section 6651(a)(3) and $100.00 under
section 6651. This would total $975.00 and, at this point, interest would begin
1988]
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to accrue. Assuming an interest rate of 10%:
YEAR ONE $1,077.53
YEAR FIVE $1,607.39
YEAR TEN $2,649.96
It can be seen that in ten years the original deficiency of $500.00 has in-
creased 530% due to the combined effect of interest and penalties.
If a taxpayer is subject to a single penalty at either the 25 % or 50% rate,
the interest generated at the current rate as prescribed by IRS Code would pro-
duce the following results.
Example 2. $1000.00 assessment at 25 % penalty
YEAR ONE $1,250.00
YEAR FIVE $2,013.14
YEAR TEN $3,242.18
Example 3. $1000.00 assessment at 50% penalty
YEAR ONE $1,500.00
YEAR FIVE $2,415.77
YEAR TEN $3,890.61
As illustrated by the above two examples of a singular penalty, the amount
due has increased over 320% as a result of the tacking of interest.
Penalties on penalties and tax deficiency indicate a policy of revenue
yield from penalties.
In United States v. Thompson, 279 F.2d. 165, 168-169 (10th Cir. 1960) quoting
Helvering v. Mitchel, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938), we observed that given the
policy underlying civil fraud penalty provision of (6653) that "the purpose of
the additional assessment of 50 percent of the amount of the tax deficiency is
to reimburse the government for the heavy expense of investigation and the
loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud."
Internal Revenue Code Section 6622 requires all interest payable under
the Internal Revenue laws to be compounded on a daily basis, while the bond
market normally calculates yields to a maturity by compounding on a semi-
annual basis.
Lack of clear Congressional guidance as to policy results in auditing agents
applying all available penalties in almost all audits where the taxpayer is not
assisted by a qualified representative; most low-income taxpayers do not have
a qualified representative at the audit level.
Practically speaking, many people who make less than $25,000, our sug-
gested standard for a "low-income taxpayer," could not afford representation
in any form. We suggest, in the alternative, that taxpayers of this classification
either be provided with pro bono representation when they have a deficiency
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assessed, or that they receive different treatment with respect to the penalties
and interest attached to their assessment.
We were interested in seeing how many cases were won by the IRS and
how many by the taxpayer at the Tax Court level. The only available informa-
tion on this subject was a table in the 1986 IRS Annual Report which listed
1979 and 1980 results for cases with opinions rendered in different courts. It
is our contention that many of the cases lost by taxpayers are argued pro se.
Those that are represented by legal counsel win most of the time. The govern-
ment supposedly won 52.2% of the tax cases in 1980. We believe that with
representation low-income taxpayers would not only be able to avoid the ac-
cumulation of interest and penalties, but to avoid the tax itself. Researchers
were unable to find either more current or more representative reports. For
instance, only cases for which opinions were rendered were found in the report.
ALTERNATIVE ONE:
We would suggest that at a minimum, representation should be pro-
vided to taxpayers before penalties and interest are added.
There are only a handful of pro bono IRS approved tax clinics available
in the nation to assist low-income taxpayers at the audit level. These clinics
are granted permission to practice by the Director of Practice, currently Mr.
Leslie Shapiro, and are designed to assist taxpayers in complying with the In-
ternal Revenue Code. Our Clinic also has a contract with the U.S. Tax Court,
and we litigate cases pro bono.
While we are not asking for federal funding for our Clinic, the fact re-
mains that the taxpayers of the State of Ohio have a substantial investment in
the Clinic to assist the federal government in the fair application of the federal
revenue laws and to train future practitioners. Some of our graduates actively
seek employment with the Internal Revenue Service. Congress may want to
consider that federal funding of clinics such as ours in the over 200 law schools
and graduate business colleges is an economical alternative to other proposals
to provide pro bono taxpayer representation and to further provide an educated
pool of talent to be employed by the I.R.S.
Most low-income taxpayers cannot afford quality representation and are
forced to rely on public service announcements and uninformed sources. Some
of these services are provided by the IRS. However, these services are very
limited in what they offer.
Many low-income taxpayers are not aware of the significance of the 90
day notice, or even what to do when they receive one. This information is not
provided to them in any form, from any source. Despite their lack of knowledge,
interest and penalties are assessed against them in a manner which often
precludes them from getting fair treatment under the system.
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Lack of reading skills prevent low-income taxpayers from complying
with the tax laws.
It was suggested to our Clinic that information alone, if distributed to tax-
payers, should suffice to make low-income taxpayers aware of their rights and
responsibilities. We believe that this would be insufficient and misleading as
to its intended purpose, for the following reasons:
The reading levels for the following publications, as measured by the Fry
Readability Formula, a commonly used guide to evaluate public school texts,
were found to be the following:
A Statutory Notice of Deficiency required a reading level of grade 8.70;
a Form 1040 EZ instruction book required a reading level of grade 8.45; a form
1040 instruction book required a reading level of grade 7.85; a New York Times,
March 2, 1988, required a reading level of grade 7.65; and the Wall Street Journal,
March 3, 1988, required a reading level of grade 7.10. A Statutory notice of
deficiency required a reading grade level 1.6 years higher than that of the Wall
Street Journal.
According to the US. Department of Education, the following percent of
the population would possess the skill necessary to understand the type of in-
formation contained in the 1040 or 1040 EZ instructions:
Of those persons of Black racial origin, only 19.8% would possess the skills
necessary to understand the instructions. Only 370% of those persons of
Hispanic racial origin would possess such skills. Of the general population
only 11.0% of the persons with less than a high school education could under-
stand the instructions. Also only 22.0% of persons with some high school educa-
tion could understand the instructions, and a mere 50.2 % of high school
graduates having less than two years of postsecondary education could under-
stand the instructions. Of persons with a two-year degree or more than two
years of postsecondary education, 82.8% can understand the instructions.
These studies indicate that four out of five Blacks or persons without a
completed high school education, two out of three Hispanics, and nine out of
ten persons with less than a high school education, cannot comprehend the
instructions for a Form 1040, or a 1040 EZ, and a Notice of Deficiency is even
more difficult.
The major problem in the readability of these documents is the complex-
ity of their sentence structure. The average sentence length of these publica-
tions exceeds 25 words. To add to the complexity, one-third of the words in
these publications are multi-syllabled words. This problem can and should be
corrected.
This analysis is based on applying the Fry Tables to studies by Kirsch and
Jungeblut, Literacy: Profiles of America's Young Adults, U.S. Department of
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Education Research and Improvement, final contractor order from Educational
Testing Service, September 1986.
If the taxpayer cannot read the instructions, how can the government ex-
pect compliance? We have no reason to believe that information distributed to
the taxpayers about their rights and responsibilities with respect to unpaid taxes
would be written at a greater level of understandability. Taxpayers in general,
and especially low-income taxpayers, would never be able to read and com-
prehend such information. It is imperative that they be assisted if the penalty
system is not improved.
Another suggestion is that low-income taxpayers should be told to call some-
one at the IRS level to obtain information about their rights and responsibilities
with respect to deficiencies. For instance, most taxpayers are not aware that
they only have 90 days to object to an assessment before their relief is barred
without litigation. Most low-income taxpayers will probably have the penalties
automatically assessed because of their lack of information.
We also do not believe that a phone line will be beneficial. Studies have
shown an error rate for the call in question and answer system set up by the
IRS ranged from 25 %, as reported by Commissioner Gibbs, to 39 % as reported
by The General Accounting Office. Either way, the information does not seem
to be reliable. It is imperative that low-income taxpayers be informed, not
misinformed.
For the reasons stated above we firmly believe that a requirement of
representation should be used in conjunction with the penalty system.
ALTERNATIVE Two:
If taxpayers who are not able to provide their own representation are
not to be provided with representation, we believe that the penalty system
should be altered with respect to them.
We are not advocating the complete prohibition of interest and penalties
based on a gross income level of less than $25,000, even though this looks to
be a very feasible possibility, but are instead suggesting the implementation
of a system which would permit low-income taxpayers to at least be presented
with a forum before the interest and penalties become so outrageous that they
will never have "their day in court."
We acknowledge that to effectively administer the tax laws it is necessary
to limit the ability of a taxpayer to abuse judicial economy and prevent wasting
the court's time. However, many low-income tax payers are in a position as
to not even be able to pay the tax itself let alone all of the attached interest
and penalties.
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B. Regressive Economic Impact
In our Tax Clinic, we have encountered several cases where taxpayers, for
differing reasons, had missed-the 90-day period to protest the assessment, yet
could not afford to pay the tax in order to litigate the matter.
One such case involved an innocent spouse who had filed a joint return
with her husband at his insistence after a separation, but before a divorce. Once
divorced, he received the notice of deficiency and yet failed to contact her and
give her notice. By the time we had been approached to represent her, a tax
of approximately $1000, which she could never have paid in the first place,
had been increased by interest and penalties to over $2000, which she STILL
has not been able to pay. Because the Tax Court has no jurisdiction to hear
this case, we as a Clinic are not able to defend her in this matter. The interest
and penalties are still accruing, far beyond what she will ever be able to pay.
This particular taxpayer has a number of potentially valid defenses to the
liability on the tax yet she is prevented from having herself cleared of such
liability because of the jurisdictional requirement. To add insult to injury, she
is being charged interest and penalties on a daily basis. We believe that there
are several ways that taxpayers in this situation, the number of whom are far
greater than one would imagine, could be afforded relief.
A taxpayer who is to receive these suggested allowances should be able
to demonstrate an inability to pay the deficiency, a prima facie meritorious
defense to the deficiency, and present a case of ineffective notice. The allowances
could be, but are not limited to, the ability of U.S. Tax Court to grant exten-
sions of time past the 90-day imposed threshold, the staying of the accumula-
tipn of interest and penalties until one has received sufficient notice, or even
the ability of the Tax Court to obtain jurisdiction upon payment of a portion
of the tax itself rather than all of the tax, penalties and interest.
The extension on time which, we suggest, would be analogous to that per-
mitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as found in rule 6(b). The Tax
Court, if directed, could choose to accept petitions on deficiencies after the
90-day period has expired. This would not affect the ability of the Government
to use the penalty system as a revenue raiser. If the taxpayer does not have a
meritorious defense, or cannot prove their innocence, the Government will then
be able to assess interest and penalties.
By refusing taxpayers with meritorious claims the ability to prove their
innocence, the Government is merely padding the books as to outstanding
"revenues" available for collection. In most cases, based on information received
from private tax practitioners, when a person is able to get to court, many if
not most, of the penalties themselves are abated. Therefore, it is our conten-
tion that the low-income tax payers, who cannot get into court or do not know
about the system of abatement are accumulating large debts attributable to in-
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terest and penalties, which will prevent them from ever being relieved of
this liability.
As a practical matter, these "revenues" will never be collected. but they
will be a burden and embarrassment to otherwise lawful citizens. In all of our
extensive research we were unable to find any statistics to show exactly how
much of the outstanding federal debt attributable to uncollected taxes are the
responsibility of low-income taxpayers. We wanted this information to see how
heavily the penalty system affected this class of taxpayers.
With respect to our second suggestion, the staying of the accumulation of
interest and penalties until the taxpayer in question has received sufficient notice,
is partly self explanatory. We contend that in order to assess penalties and in-
terest charges, the IRS should be required to prove that the taxpayer did, in
fact, receive notice. This could be accomplished simply by requiring that the
notice of deficiency be delivered by certified mail. Until the IRS can make a
showing that the taxpayer received and understood the significance of the defi-
ciency, we believe that no penalties should be assessed.
Extremely low personal exemptions in the Code result in a low-income
taxpayer being able to retain out of earnings after I.R.S. levy on wages, a weekly
sum less than the taxpayer could receive in levy exempt unemployment payments.
I.R.C. section 6334 provides that various types of property shall be exempt
from levy.
Internal Revenue Code Section 6334(a)(4) provides that unemployment com-
pensation payments are exempt from levy. Section 6334(d) provides that there
shall be exempt from levy $75 per week of wages, salary or other income ex-
empt from levy plus $25 for the spouse and each individual for which the tax-
payer has provided over half the support. For example, a single individual with
no dependents might choose to "lose" his job if he would receive more than
$75 dollars per week in unemployment compensation.
Also, Policy Statement P-5-32 of the Internal Revenue Manual provides
that, although not exempt, welfare payments will not be levied against. Therefore,
the same situation exists in regards to welfare payments as for unemployment
compensation. A taxpayer may very well be faced with the choice of working
and keeping only $75 per week or going on public assistance to receive a
"pay raise."
The scenarios described cannot be beneficial to the government or the tax-
payer and we support increasing the exempt amount in 6334(d)(1) to an amount
that would not encourage this practice.
Existing penalty and interest structure added to the deficiency, invariably
exacerbate the plight of the low-income taxpayer. A wage levy of all amounts
in excess of exemptions often never reduces the primary tax deficiency, since
19881
19
Creme and Childs: Testimony: Finance Subcommittee on Penalties
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
the interest and penalties accrue greater than the maximum levy.
For example, the Tax Clinic has what it feels is a meritorious defense to
a deficiency assessed for Social Security taxes. The taxpayer in question was
a State of Ohio employee, and therefore should never have been subject to federal
social security taxes. Notwithstanding this fact, the taxpayer received a direct
assessment and was not afforded an opportunity to litigate his claim in Tax
Court. When we first encountered this case the taxpayer was making $18,000
per year and could not be levied against in an amount sufficient to reduce his
outstanding liability.
Such amounts carried on the books of the I.R.S. as collectible are
illusory and, in reality, are uncollectible.
Due to the three-year rule the low income taxpayer can find no relief in
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. sec. 507. See 11 U.S.C.A. sec. 523.
Voluntary compliance with the tax laws is negatively impacted by the
regressive economic effect of the existing perception on the part of the low-
income taxpayer of a revenue yield policy: it is seen as unfair; it is seen as
a form of legal blackmail; and it encourages an underground economy at the
lower end of the economic spectrum.
C. Existing policy with its regressive impact on low-income taxpayers amounts
to de facto confiscation, with few effective due process of law remedies
available.
Unrepresented low-income taxpayers do not fully understand their rights
under the existing statutory notice of deficiency. In divorce situations, one par-
ty often does not even receive the notice, and loses the 90-day window to litigate
such provisions as innocent spouse, in Tax Court without full payment.
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides,
inter alia, that no person shall ". . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. . . ." The Supreme Court has interpreted "due
process of law" to include a right of access to the courts: ". . . [although] many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process
Clause, there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation
of life, liberty, or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." (Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, at 313 (1950); emphasis supplied); "It is to
courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the
implementation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement. Within
this framework, those who wrote our original Constitution, in the Fifth Amend-
ment, and later those who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the
centrality of the concept of due process in the operation of this system. Without
this guarantee that one may not be deprived of rights, neither liberty nor prop-
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erty, without due process of law, the State's monopoly over techniques for bind-
ing conflict resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable under our scheme
of things." (Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, at 374 (1970)); and, most
significantly, "Just as a generally valid notice procedure may fail to satisfy due
process because of the circumstances of the defendant, so too a cost require-
ment, valid on its face, may offend due process because it operates to foreclose
a particular party's opportunity to be heard. The State's obligations under the
Fourteenth Amendment are not simply generalized ones; rather, the State owes
to each individual that process which, in light of the values of a free society,
can be characterized as due."
We have included these references to point out the fact that the courts have
interpreted due process of law to include access to the courts regardless of
economic circumstances. The payment of the assessment and filing fees, while
it would present no major problem for most of us, may be an insurmountable
barrier to the low-income taxpayer, who often finds it difficult merely to pro-
vide himself and his family with the bare necessities of life. The low-income
taxpayer is, in effect, denied any judicial remedy, just as surely as though the
doors to the courthouse were locked in front of him.
A $60.00 filing fee intimidates some low-income taxpayers, who consider
such an amount a fortune, and who are not capable of appreciating what lies
in store for them. This type of litigation is by no means frivolous, nor should
this right be treated as a luxury, since the low-income taxpayer has a much
greater proportional interest at stake than the middle or high-income taxpayer;
for the low-income person, the question is often not whether he will eat steak
or hamburger, but whether he will eat.
It is worth noting at this point that there is a certain deference associated
with what has been called the "tax label"; that is, when a statute is labeled
a "tax" statute, it is scrutinized differently than any other type of legislation
(see Sundberg, Jacob W. F., The Tax Label, privately published). That is the
case here, since the principle of due process of law seems to operate in a vacuum
in tax cases, with the justification being couched in such terms as "tax autonomy"
and "tax sovereignty" and the use of such phrases as "legislative grace" in
describing the "privilege" to litigate these matters. Certainly, the founders never
intended to create exceptions to fundamental civil rights, such as due process,
simply because one of the parties represents the administrative apparatus of
the State.
The failure of a statutory notice of deficiency being received by one
of the spouses is common in a divorce situation.
Under IRC Section 6212(b)(2), when a joint income tax return is involved,
the Internal Revenue Service is permitted to send a single joint notice of defi-
ciency to the taxpayers at their last known address. This is true unless either
spouse has notified the I.R.S. that separate residences have been established.
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Under Internal Revenue Code Regulation 301.6212-1(b)(2), this notice must be
sent to the district director for the district in which the return has been filed.
Therefore, even though the taxpayers may be divorced and have actually estab-
lished separate residences and filed subsequent income tax returns using their
new addresses, the I.R.S. may still send a single joint notice of deficiency. Thus,
one of the two persons involved will not receive a notice of deficiency. Edward
J. Camous, 67 TC 721.
Most low-income taxpayers are not sophisticated enough to know that they
are required to notify the IRS of their new address upon being divorced. Even
fewer taxpayers would know or have the means to find out that the notice is
to be sent to the district director.
The failure of the I.R.S. to ascertain the latest address of the separate tax-
payers, and to send separate notices to them, could be construed as a denial
of due process, since adequate notice to defend will not reach at least one par-
ty. The I.R.S. should at least be required to consult their central computer to
see if there is a more recent address for each of the taxpayers involved. In cases
where the I.R.S. may not be aware of a divorce situation, this computer check
could also establish the current marital status of the taxpayers (per the filing
status on subsequent returns filed). While this may not solve all the problems
involved in this area, it could eliminate some of the bitterness towards the IRS
in this situation.
Certain assessments can be made under the Internal Revenue Code without
the taxpayer receiving a notice of deficiency. The most commonly seen illustra-
tion of this is probably Internal Revenue Code Section 6213(b)(1) which allows
the I.R.S. to assess taxes in cases dealing with "mathematical or clerical errors."
Any assessments made in these circumstances cannot be litigated in Tax Court,
since a notice of deficiency is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and Section 6213(b)(1)
specifically states that the notice of such an assessment shall not be considered
a notice of deficiency. While the notice of such an assessment is required to
explain the alleged error, it is not required to include an explanation of the
taxpayers appeal rights. IRC Section 6213(b)(2) allows for the automatic abate-
ment of these assessments, if the taxpayer files a request for abatement with
the Secretary within 60 days of notice of such assessments. While in most cases
these mathematical and clerical errors will indeed be errors (as defined in the
Internal Revenue Code), in a few cases they are correct.
II. PENALTIES As A DETERRENT To NON-COMPLIANCE.
A. The prevailing view since the inception of the Internal Revenue Code.
Historically, there were no interest sensitive penalties, which resulted in
a less regressive economic impact on low-income taxpayers. Low-income tax-
payers traditionally purchase a larger percentage of goods and services on credit,
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paying interest. Interest-sensitive penalties add to an already heavy interest
burden. Penalties as a percentage of deficiency have a theoretical non-regressive,
non-progressive economic impact. This theory is not borne out for the low-
income taxpayer, where the deficiency itself may represent a higher percentage
of net spendable income after basic necessities than to a higher-income tax-
payer. A larger percentage of higher.-income taxpayers have the services of
qualified representatives at audit and appeals, who succeed in obtaining remis-
sion of penalties. Disparity of representation creates a reduced, but still
regressive, economic impact to such penalties.
REVENUE YIELD POLICY FROM PENALTIES
The revenue yield from penalties as presently enacted results in a regressive
economic, impact on the low-income taxpayer. As stated before, for a great
number of low-income taxpayers the tax deficiency itself is an insurmountable
burden. The University of Akron Tax Litigation Clinic sees this situation in
almost all of its cases. Many times, just to pay the tax, installment payments
have to be arranged. However, these taxpayers are at an advantage. They have
had some sort of representation who has informed them of the availability of
the installment system. Unrepresented taxpayers will probably not know of this
arrangement.
We cannot hope to represent them fairly and equitably if the dictates of
the Code are not followed. Since we have gone from the deterrent effect as
intended by Congress when the penalties were enacted, to a revenue raising
purpose, it is time to revamp the consequences to taxpayers who are no longer
fairly represented. Regardless of the intention of Congress, or the Courts, in
writing and interpreting the penalty system of the Internal Revenue Code, what
is most important is how the Code is interpreted by the I.R.S., both for and
against the taxpayer.
What is the reason for the implementation of the penalty system? Was it
designed to have a deterrent effect, or was it designed to raise revenue? The
answer to this question is of vital importance, especially to the low-income
taxpayer.
When the penalty system was originally enacted, it was to enforce the col-
lection of duties and taxes. Dorsheimer v. U.S. 74 U.S. 166 (1868). Currently,
there are differing views for its use depending, on who is speaking.
The Internal Revenue Manual states that fair and equitable treatment of
taxpayers requires the I.R.S. to administer civil penalties in a manner which
fosters voluntary compliance and confidence in the tax system. The I.R.S. will
strive to meet this expectation in the interest of fairness, equality and effective
tax administration.
More recent discussions belie the original intent of the penalty system,
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with so much emphasis placed on the amount of revenue which is raised or
to be raised as a result of the penalty system. Review of Taxation of Individuals,
No. 1, 47 (1987) said that the penalty area is a growth industry for the I.R.S.
Penalties contributed more than $3 billion in 1985, while contributing untold
dollars to the system, by encouraging increased voluntary compliance by fear.
The legislative history of years 1981 through 1987 indicate a trend towards
the idea of using penalties as a revenue raiser.
While little-considered by the courts, there is a de facto lack of equal pro-
tection. Congress has also not adequately recognized, nor has it addressed,
this problem in considering penalties. The low-income taxpayer has about as
much knowledge of how to obtain abatement of a penalty through problems
resolution as he/she does of getting to the moon. Abuses by high-income tax-
payers have brought about a plethora of new penalties. Unfortunately, the low-
income taxpayer has been caught in this net. The number of penalties should
be a deterrent, not a means for increasing revenue. Stacking of penalties generally
works as a deterrent for high-income taxpayers, and, in this context, stacking
of penalties is a progressive economic concept. However, penalty-stacking is
also economically regressive at the lower end of the economic spectrum. Penalty-
stacking for all tax noncompliance violates the concept that stacking is meant
to deter specific tax conduct.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS.
A. Interest-sensitive penalties.
These penalties should have a floor placed under them.
A taxpayer with a minimal standard of living taxable income should be
exempt. There is economic savings in administration cost of collection due to
the fact that at this level the penalties are, in fact, uncollectible. It minimizes
regressiveness. As revenue raisers they will deter flagrant misconduct by high
income tax abusers. It instills a degree of progressivism to the tax system. Pro-
gressivism is then the price the abuser pays.
B. Penalty-stacking.
Abatement of the second or higher non-interest sensitive penalty should
be made an audit function for a low-income taxpayer; i.e., below a certain
economic floor. The low-income floor should be set by Congress and indexed.
Stacked penalties should be automatically abated if a taxpayer, after levey, does
not have sufficient income to be paying on the primary deficiency.
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C. Other needed remedies for the low-income taxpayer.
The mandatory services of a qualified representative or ombudsman
before a wage levy should be required.
The services of a qualified representative will increase the opportunities
available to the low-income taxpayer to pursue the abatement of certain penalties
and interest assessed by the IRS. A qualified representative could also provide
a first-tier screening process as to the validity of the taxpayers' defense.
Indexed and higher amounts should be exempt from wage levy.
Present law states, in Section 6334(d)(1), that the following amount is ex-
empt from wage levy: "* . . in the case of an individual who is paid or receives
all of his wages, salary, and other income on a weekly basis, the amount of
the wages, salary, and other income payable to or received by him during any
week which is exempt from levy under subsection (a)(9) shall be $75.00 plus
$25.00 for each individual who is specified in a written statement . . .
It appears, in today's environment, that it would be extremely difficult for
a family of four to exist on a mandatory stipend of $150.00 per week. This
removes, or reduces, an individual's incentive to work and would tend to en-
courage unemployment coupled with increased reliance upon government
assistance. This has what we consider to be three major drawbacks: 1. Inability
to collect the original deficiency; 2. Reduced future tax revenues since earned
income is now non-existent; and, 3. Increased public expenditures due to reliance
on public-assistance programs.
The ability to obtain bankruptcy relief for all taxes, interest, and
penalties for the low-income taxpayer.
Currently, the IRS code does not permit relief even when a taxpayer is
in bankruptcy. It is our feeling that this is unfair treatment for the economical-
ly disadvantaged.
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